EU Sanctions in Context: Three Types by BIERSTEKER, Thomas & PORTELA, Clara
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
7-2015
EU Sanctions in Context: Three Types
Thomas BIERSTEKER
Clara PORTELA
Singapore Management University, claraportela@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2815/54101
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Eastern European Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, and the
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BIERSTEKER, Thomas and PORTELA, Clara, "EU Sanctions in Context: Three Types" (2015). Research Collection School of Social
Sciences. Paper 1688.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1688
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1688
European Union Institute for Security Studies July 2015 1
26
2 0 1 5
All international sanctions are embedded in 
larger contexts of overlapping policy instru-
ments and other sanctions regimes. Yet we tend 
to look at sanctions and evaluate their effective-
ness from the vantage point of a single sender 
of sanctions – whether it is the UN, the EU, or 
an individual country like the United States – 
rather than consider the combined and inter-
active effects of different, co-existing sanctions 
regimes. 
EU sanctions tend to be imposed in conjunction 
with measures by other actors: their interplay 
deserves closer analysis in terms of sequencing, 
objectives, complexity and legitimacy. The lat-
ter is particularly important, given recent criti-
cisms of unilateral sanctions measures voiced at 
UN forums such as the General Assembly and 
the Human Rights Council.
Three types of ‘embeddedness’ 
There are three different major types of EU 
sanctions applied in combination with other 
sanctions regimes. First, there is the EU as an 
implementer of UN sanctions. All members 
of the UN are obliged to implement sanctions 
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, and the EU gives such measures 
standing in European law through two pieces of 
legislation: a Council decision under the CFSP 
followed by the adoption of a regulation. The 
EU sanctions on Liberia, Angola, Guinea Bissau, 
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and 
South Sudan are all examples of this type of EU 
sanction. The EU measures are thus ‘embedded’ 
in universally applicable UN sanctions, legiti-
mated by the UN Security Council and, at least 
in theory, implemented by all member states of 
the UN. Since these measures simply give effect 
to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) de-
cisions, no independent role or initiative of the 
EU is observable here. 
Second, there are EU autonomous sanctions 
that go beyond UN sanctions, sometimes de-
scribed as ‘supplementary’ measures. These are 
additional measures taken to strengthen UN 
sanctions regimes. Often, these are based upon 
the wording of UNSC resolutions. For exam-
ple, when the UN Security Council urges mem-
ber states to ‘exercise vigilance’ with regard to 
the implementation of sanctions taken under 
Chapter VII, the EU may decide to add supple-
mentary sanctions. The EU sanctions on Iran 
since 2010, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Libya in 2011, and Côte d’Ivoire 
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in 2011 are examples of this type of EU sanc-
tion.  The legitimacy of these measures has re-
cently been called into question by some UN 
members – particularly UNSC permanent mem-
bers Russia and China – in what is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘floor versus ceiling’ debate: 
i.e., whether UN sanctions should be consid-
ered the ‘floor’ on which other measures can be 
built or whether they constitute the ‘ceiling’ (or 
limit) on what is legitimate.
Third, there are EU autonomous sanctions ap-
plied in the absence of UN sanctions. These are 
employed in instances where the UN Security 
Council is unable to reach agreement due to 
opposition by a Permanent Member. They also 
serve as an instrument of EU foreign policy, 
with a view to expressing concern about what 
is believed to be unacceptable behaviour and 
to reaffirming EU values on the international 
scene. 
The EU sanctions on Syria, Russia, Ukraine, 
Burma/Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Belarus, China, 
Uzbekistan or the Comoros are examples of this 
category of EU sanction. The EU sanctions are 
typically applied in conjunction with unilateral 
measures by the United States or by other coun-
tries or regional organisations. However, it is 
this category of meas-
ures, in particular, 
that has come under 
fire at the UN Human 
Rights Council which 
in September 2014 
adopted a resolution 
on the negative im-
pact of unilateral coer-
cive measures on the 
enjoyment of human 
rights.
This brief survey does not aim to be exhaus-
tive: it is simply indicative of the different kinds 
of combinations that exist. These distinctions, 
however, are not entirely separate and hermet-
ic: one can be transformed into another, such 
as when an autonomous EU sanctions regime 
is subsequently legitimated by UN action that 
extends the EU measures on a global scale.
Sequencing of regimes 
How do EU sanctions regimes interact with 
measures by other senders? In terms of sequenc-
ing, the first type – implementing EU sanctions 
that give effect to UN measures – are invariably 
adopted shortly after the UNSC resolution. By 
definition, supplementary EU sanctions also fol-
low UN measures. However, they can be po-
litically sensitive, which explains why they 
sometimes refer to the language of UNSC res-
olutions: often, but not always, EU sanctions 
invoke language calling upon UN members to 
‘exercise vigilance’ with regard to implement-
ing the terms of the resolution. Supplementary 
measures agreed by the EU often take the form 
of additional designations of individuals and 
entities that are merged with UN lists, which 
makes them difficult to distinguish from UNSC 
measures in the eyes of the general public. 
Sometimes, the supplementary measures are 
adopted concurrently with the enactment of 
mandatory UN sanctions, as was the case with 
the Libya sanctions of early 2011. In other cas-
es, additional measures are only agreed years af-
ter the UN sanctions were enacted. This might 
be due to an initial reluctance to adopt meas-
ures beyond the letter of the UNSC resolution 
which, over time, subsides due to a growing 
frustration with unsuccessful negotiations, as 
was the case with Iran. 
Alternatively, EU sanctions might be imposed 
on a target that is already the subject of UN 
sanctions when a new crisis erupts, complicat-
ing the situation with 
regard to which the 
original UN measures 
were imposed. Such 
was the case with the 
crisis that followed 
the presidential elec-
tions in Côte d’Ivoire 
in November 2010: 
it gave rise to a new 
unilateral sanctions 
regime on top of the 
original UN sanctions, 
which had addressed the armed conflict from 
the previous decade and had targeted both par-
ties to the conflict. 
The EU seldom ‘goes it alone.’ Autonomous 
EU sanctions are often the subject of coopera-
tion with other senders such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the African Union, the Arab League and, most 
frequently, the United States. Indeed, autono-
mous EU sanctions practice gives clear ex-
pression to the transatlantic orientation of 
the Union’s foreign and security policy. The 
vast majority of EU autonomous measures 
are imposed alongside Washington. Examples 
abound: Syria, Belarus, Russia/Ukraine, Burma/
‘Autonomous EU sanctions are often 
the subject of cooperation with 
other senders such as the Economic 
Community of West African States, 
the African Union, the Arab League 
and, most frequently, the US.’
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Myanmar, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Sudan or China 
are cases in point. 
Still, the specific measures imposed by 
Washington and Brussels do not always coin-
cide. In fact, the transatlantic partners are not 
always on the same page when it comes to sanc-
tions policy. This is best exemplified by the extra-
territorial application of US sanctions on Cuba, 
vocally opposed by the EU. The same is true 
for the objectives pursued by sanctions: while 
Washington often advocates regime change, 
the EU tends to demand compliance from the 
target, however adversarial the relationship. 
Finally, Washington 
and Brussels differ 
in their approaches 
to the termination of 
sanctions. While the 
EU is often ready to 
ease sanctions after 
the target has taken 
credible steps towards 
compliance, the US 
is reluctant to modify 
sanctions regimes be-
fore full compliance has been achieved. 
The negotiations on the lifting of sanctions 
against Tehran have occasionally highlighted 
the divergences between the two sides of the 
Atlantic with regard to the imposition of these 
measures.  Sometimes these discrepancies be-
tween the EU and US sanctions policies can be 
played to advantage, such as in the case of the 
sanctions imposed on Russia over Ukraine. The 
US has less economic interdependence with 
Russia and has applied wider and harsher sanc-
tions than the EU. This can contribute to open-
ing a bargaining space for the EU, as evidenced 
for example by the Minsk Process, since EU 
members have less extensive sanctions (and use 
less vehement rhetoric) than the US.
Despite their occasionally unilateral character, 
EU measures are closely interlinked with UN 
practice. Observers often fail to notice how 
frequently regional organisations prompt the 
UNSC to use their sanctions to endorse regional 
sanctions, often at the instigation of these same 
organisations. EU sanctions are sometimes a 
prelude to the imposition of UN sanctions: EU 
arms embargoes on Sudan, DRC and the former 
Yugoslavia pre-date identical measures under-
taken by the UN. 
The EU has also maintained sanctions af-
ter the UN has lifted them: examples include 
the sanctions kept in place against the former 
Yugoslavia following the termination of UN 
measures after the Dayton Accords, and the 
maintenance of an arms embargo on Libya once 
the UNSC lifted in 2003 the measures it had 
imposed after the Lockerbie bombings. 
Different aims and contexts 
The three types of EU sanctions tend to be as-
sociated with different sets of objectives.
Implementing sanctions are primarily associated 
with the UN’s traditional preoccupation with 
the cessation of armed 
conflict, but the UN 
Security Council has 
expanded its sanc-
tions mandate since 
the end of the Cold 
War to address ter-
rorism and prolifera-
tion. More innovative 
concepts have been 
included among the 
goals, such as revers-
ing unconstitutional change of government, 
and giving concrete expression to the notion of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
Supplementary EU sanctions are primarily de-
voted to non-proliferation goals, as in Iran and 
the DPRK, and to cases of armed conflict where 
strong historical and economic interests of an 
EU member are at stake, as in Libya or the Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
Autonomous EU sanctions typically involve cases 
where the UNSC cannot agree. This is illustrat-
ed in the case of Syria, where Russia and China 
wielded their vetoes at least in part out of dis-
satisfaction with the expansion of the objectives 
of the no-fly zone over Libya to include regime 
change in 2011. 
Agreement on sanctions at the UNSC also fails 
to materialise in cases directly involving the 
behaviour of a P5 member (Russia, Ukraine, 
China), support for democracy and the rule of 
law (Burma/Myanmar, Zimbabwe), and instanc-
es of significant human rights violations against 
a background of armed conflict (Syria, Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant).
Relationships and legitimacy 
Implementing sanctions constitute an obligation 
under the UN Charter; here, the EU is simply 
‘‘While the EU is often ready to ease 
sanctions after the target has taken 
credible steps towards compliance, 
the US is reluctant to modify sanctions 
regimes before full compliance has 
been achieved.’ 
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complying with international law. The only 
difference vis-à-vis the implementation of UN 
sanctions elsewhere is that this is normally ac-
complished through national legislation. On 
account of the EU’s exclusive competence in ex-
ternal trade, EU member states have to implement 
the measures through the European Community. 
Implementing sanctions are universally regarded 
as legitimate international sanctions, and tend to 
be challenged only by the targeted parties them-
selves.
Supplementary sanctions, by contrast, have given 
rise to some controversy within the UN Security 
Council. While some – notably Western – mem-
bers see supplementary measures as strengthen-
ing UN sanctions, others are weary of a practice 
that effectively expands the scope of the meas-
ures. They also argue that supplementary sanc-
tions undermine the legitimacy of UN measures, 
since targets often do not differentiate sanctions 
by their source. Supplementary sanctions are thus 
increasingly being challenged in UN forums, par-
ticularly in the ‘floor versus ceiling’ debate among 
the P5.
Genuinely autonomous EU sanctions have prov-
en even more controversial. Indeed, this type of 
sanction is currently being challenged in the con-
text of a recent (26 September 2014) resolution 
on unilateral coercive measures at the UN Human 
Rights Council. Here, the EU’s commitment to 
multilateralism is put to the test, since multilat-
eral sanctions are understood as UN-mandated 
measures only. In the sanctions field, the EU is 
undoubtedly a cooperation-oriented partner: the 
Union almost invariably works closely in tandem 
with the US. Its bans often co-exist with sanctions 
imposed by regional organisations, which it sees 
as enhancing the regional and global legitimacy of 
its measures (not to mention their effectiveness). 
The EU sanctions regime on Syria is a case in 
point. It was imposed alongside similar measures 
by the US; a few months later, Turkey and the 
Arab League followed suit with sanctions regimes 
of their own. Another example of cooperation 
with a regional organisation took place during the 
Ivorian crisis of 2011, when the EU and ECOWAS 
joined forces to bring an end to the conflict.
 Finally, the legality of individual designations fea-
tured on both UN and EU sanctions lists has also 
been challenged through litigation in European 
courts, often successfully (in two out of three 
cases). Thus, while the EU views itself as a team 
player in its sanctions effort, the legitimacy of its 
measures is increasingly questioned. 
Complex multilateralism
While the effectiveness of these different types of 
EU sanctions deserves further study, their status 
in relation to other sanctions regimes clearly mat-
ters. Implementing sanctions have the broadest 
scope and most legitimacy, but they are, in actual 
fact, UN sanctions. Supplementary sanctions can 
make a significant difference in ongoing negotia-
tions, as they did in the case of Iran, where they 
were applied in the wake of decades of unsuccess-
ful US unilateral comprehensive sanctions, and 
legitimated by the highly targeted UN sanctions 
that preceded them. Fully autonomous EU sanc-
tions not only provide an essential way of com-
municating EU norms, but can also create space 
for negotiations, as in the case of Russia. 
It is important to distinguish analytically between 
these different types of ‘embedded’ EU sanctions. 
Even though we tend to evaluate them from the 
perspective of the senders of sanctions, when 
seen from the vantage point of the target, it is the 
combination and the interactive effects, not the 
source, of the measures that matters most. 
One final point: the EU regards itself as an un-
equivocally multilateral actor given that it imple-
ments UN-mandated measures stringently and al-
most invariably imposes sanctions in unison with 
other senders. Supplementary and autonomous 
measures, however, are tricky. Instead of firmly 
positioning the EU as a multilateral actor, they 
have the potential of doing exactly the opposite: 
for much of the non-Western world, these meas-
ures are perceived as illegitimate, as evidenced by 
several initiatives at UN level to which the EU has 
not yet responded. And supplementary sanctions 
can create reputational problems for the UN it-
self, when it is included collectively in blame for 
measures applied by the EU and other senders.   
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